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CORPORATE EARNINGS AS "GAINS, PROFITS AND
INCOME" AS DEPENDING UPON THE TIME
OF THEIR ACCRUAL.
discussion here has to do with the earnings cf corporations
T HEasof taxable
income, whether such earnings remain in the hands
the corporation accumulating them, or are distributed to
the stockholders as dividends, the inquiry being limited, however,
to the question of the time of their accrual as affecting their taxability.
A number of late cases in the Federal Courts arising under the
INCOME TAX AcT of October 3rd, 1913, have dealt with this subject. In all of these ca~es the specific point in issue was this: Are
earnings of a corporation which accrued prior to the incidence of
the income tax sought to be imposed, but paid to or received by
another corporation or individual as dividends ::mbsequent thereto,
taxable as income? On this prop.osition the several Federal Courts
that have passed upon it are in hopeless conflict. In the late case of
Lewellyn, Collector v. Gulf Oil Company/ the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in overruling the District
Court, holds that such income is taxable; and to the same effect are
the late cases o£Towne v. Eisner, and Southern Pacific v. Lowe.2
· The opposite, and as we believe, manifestly correct conclusion
is arrived at in the recent cases of Lynch v. Hornby, 8 Lynch v.
Turrish, 8 and in the Gulf Oil Case, supra, in the District Court;
and the same general view is taken in a number of cases construing
earlier revenue laws.'
As will be seen, the Act of September 8th, 1916, did much to
clear up the confusion but it remained for Congress, by the amendments to that Act introduced into the WAR INCOME AcT of October
3rd, 1917, to fix definitely just what corporate assets are and are
not taxable, (and if taxable to what extent), as income so far as
their taxability is dependent upon the time of their accrual. The
word "accrued" wherever used is to be taken in its usual and
1 Lewellyn, Collector, v. Gulf Oil Corp (1917), .245 Fed. 1.
v. Eisner (1917), .242 Fed. 702; Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe (1917),
.238 Fed. 847.
•Lynch v. Turrish (1916), .236 Fed. 653; Lynch v. Hornby, .236 Fed. 661; Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Lewellyn (1917), .24.2 Fed. 709.
"Gray v. Darlington (1872), 15 Wall. (U. S.) 63; Bailey, Collector v. Railroad Co.
(1882), 106 U. S. 109; Mitchell Brothers Co. v. Doyle, Collector (1915), .2.25 Fed. 437;
Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States (1917), .242 Fed. 18.
~Towne
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ordinary legal meaning, that is as synonymous with the words
"c:arned" or "accumulated".
Under the express language of the law as it now is, we are unable
to conceive how any court can again fall into the palpable error
which we believe inheres in the Lowe, Eisner and Gulf Oil Cases.
However, these cases and those in which an opposite conclusion
was reached are significant as showing the necessity, in the interest
.:>f uniformity in the administration of the Income Tax Law, for
the changes in the law, and as emphasizing the state of the law as
it is under the instant Acts. Starting with the leading case of
Gray v. Darlington, which is the first one dealing with the point, we
sr.all attempt to trace the genesis and development of the law to the
present time.
THE DOC'l'RINE O:&' GRAY

v.

D.ARLING'l'ON.

Gray v. Darlington arose under the Civil Viar Income Tax Law.
The facts. were that the plaintiff purchased bonds prior to the enactment of the INCOME TAX Ac'£ of 1861. The bonds gradually increased
in value during a period of years and were sold subsequent to the passage of the Act at a material gain. The question was whether or not
the profit represented by this gradual increase in value was taxable as
income for the year in which the bonds were sold. It was held that it
was not. The Court speaking by Mr. Justice FIELD at p 65, said:"The advance in the value of property during a series of years can,
in no just sense, be considered the gains, profits, or income of any one
particular year of the series, although the entire amount of the advance be at one time turned into money by a sale of the property.
The statute looks, with some exceptions, for subjects of taxation
only to annual gains, profits, and income.
* * * Mere advance in value in no sense constitutes the gains,
profits, or income specified by the statute. It constitutes and can be
treated merely as increase of capital.
"The rule adopted by the officers of the revenue in the present
case would justify them in treatinv as .irains of one year the increase
in the value of property extending through any number of years,
through even the entire century. The actual advance in value of
property over its cost may, in fact, reach its height years before its
sale; the value of the property may, in truth, be less at the time of
the sale than at any previous period in ten years, yet, if the amount
received exceed the actual cost of the property, the excess is to be
treated, according to their views, as gains of the owner for the year
in which the sale takes place. We are satisfied that no such result
was intended by the statute".5
4

1

Supra, note 4.
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Taking the decision literally it would seem that even that portion
of the gain in value accruing during_ the taxable year was held not
to be taxable income. However, the principle of Gray v. Darlington
has been restricted in later cases to this e:>..1:ent, viz: that that portion of the increase in value which accrued subsequent to the incidence of the tax, is to be considered as taxable income.6 As thus
confined the doctrine laid down in Gray v. Darlington has never
been directly challenged but, as will later appear, the Lowe, Eisner
and Gulf Oil Cases are in direct conflict with it.
Bailey, Collector v. Railroad Co., also arose under the Civil War
Income Tax Law and was a suit by the Railroad Company against
·Bailey, Collector of Internal Revenue, to recover moneys which it
claimed had been illegally exacted as income tax within the meaning
of the law. The Act provided that certain corporations should be
subject to and pay a tax on the amount of interest, etc., and upon
"any dividend in scrip or money due or payable to its stockholders
as part of the earnings, profits, income or gain of such company,
and all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund
or used for construction." The Company in 1868 declared a scrip
dividend out of earnings accruing through the period from 1853 to
1868. The Supreme Court of the United States held that there was
no authority for the imposition of the tax upon so much of the
earnings as accrued prior to 1862, the date from which the tax took
e:ffect.6 • The Court speaking by -Mr. Justice MATTHEWS, at p. n4,
said:- "It should be borne in mind, in the first place, that the tax
provided for in this section is an annual income tax, and its subject is the interest paid and profits earned by the company for each
year, and year by year; and that both by the express letter of the
law, and its necessary implications, the tax is not laid on any of
these funds which came into being before the time prescribed in the
act. And in the ordinary execution of the law, it was contemplated
that the funds to be taxed, and the tax imposed upon them, would
be concurrent, as to each fiscal year; the scheme of the statute being
to levy the tax upon the income for the year ending on the 31st of
December next preceding the assessment; and while it would be
altogether admissible to go back, for the purpose of assessing a tax
upon a proper fund which had accrued during a previous year and
escaped taxation, nevertheless the tax imposed would be for the
omitted year. But no tax, in contemplation of the law, accrues upon
the fund, except for the year in which the fund itself accrued."
•Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States, Supra, note 4 at p. 19.
•• Supra, note 4.
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CASES ARISING UNDER CORPORATION EXCISE TAX LAW OF 1909.
i"'vfitclzell Bros. Company v. Doyle, Collector, was a case in which
the property of a corporation consisted chiefly of timber lands and
a saw mill, and its business, the manufacture and sale of lumber.
Held, that for the purpose of its return under the CORPORATION ExCISE TAX ACT it was entitled to deduct from its gross receipts as
capital assets a sum at least equal to the market value, at the time
the Act went into effect, of the standing timber from which the
lumber sold during the year was manufactured, although such timber
was bought years before at a smaller price; and it was also entitled
to deduct as capital assets any amount received from the sale of
cut-over or other lands sold during the year, not exceeding their
market value at the time the law went into effect. The Court in
arriving at this conclusion speaking by SESSIONS, J., at p. 440 said:"Can the government, at least in the absence of specific legislative
declaration to that effect, reach back years before the enactment of
its revenue statute for a controlling factor in determining the net
income of a corporation? Can it ignore a substantial increase in
value of property, which has occurred and accrued prior to the taking effect of the tax law, and thereby convert into income that which
is not income within any meaning of the term? To state these questions is to answer them".7
In Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States, the Railway
Company purchased stock in another company prior to January 1st,
1909, and sold such stock at a profit subsequent to January 1st,
1909. Held, that such profit was not "income" within the meaning
of the corporation Excise Act of 1909, except to the extent that the
selling price exceeded the market value on January l, 1909, but to
that e."d:ent, the selling price constituted income, it appearing that
the stock had a regular fixed stock market value. The court in this
case follows the case of Gray v. Darlington modifying it, however,
to the extent of holding that the increase in value of the stock which
accrued subsequent to January l, 1909, the date when the law became
effective, was taxable income.8
CAsEs ARISING UNDER THE AcT OF OcToBER 3, 1913.
In Lynch, Collector v. Turrish, supra, a corporation acquired certain property in 1903 which gradually increased in value for a
period of years and was finally sold in 1914 at a large profit and the
entire proceeds distributed as dividends to the stockholders in 1914.
The facts in the case showed that no increase in value had accrued
' Supra, note 4.
• Supra, note 4.
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after March 1st, 1913. It was held that the dividends so declared
were not "income, gains or profits" within the meaning of the Act
and, therefore, not taxable for the year 1914 because no income,
gains or profits accrued to the stockholder during the year 1914 or
after March 1, 1913 (the date of the incidence of the tax).
The conclusion of the court is well stated in the syllabus in the
following language :-"The enhanced value of property of a corporation, which accrues from the gradual increase in its value during a series of years prior to the effective date of an income tax law,
although divided or distributed by dividend, or othenvise, subsequent to that date, does not become 'income, gains, or profits' taxable
under such an act, but is rather an 'increase of capital assets' ".9
In this case the court discusses the underlying principles involved
in its decision in an intelligent and comprehensive way. The doctrine there laid down is undoubtedly the correct one to be applied in
determining the taxability or non-taxability of profits from sales
of property, or of dividends, with reference to the time of their
accrual. To the same effect is Lynch v. Hornby, supra.
It should be observed that in Lynch v. Turrish and in Lynch v.
Hornby, there was actually a distribution as dividends to the stockholders of capital assets but this does not weaken the authority of
the case as a precedent in support of the principle for which we are
contending. The real point of the decision is that the increase in
value of the property all accrued prior to March 1st, 1913. Had
any part of such increase accrued subsequent to March 1st, 1913,
then manifestly the court would have held such increase taxable.
Suppose again that the property had been purchased subsequently to
March 1st, 1913, then as is clearly implied in the case, the entire
proceeds of the sale would not have been held to be capital assets
but only the original cost price, and that part of the proceeds which
represented the difference between the selling price and the original
cost would have been taxable.9 a
In the case of Gulf Oil Company v. Lewellyn, Collec~or, supra,
certain subsidiary companies of the plaintiff holding company declared dividends in 1913 out of earnings, all of which accrued prior
to January 1, 1913. All of the stock of the subsidiaries except
directors' qualifying shares was owned by the plaintiff company.
The Collector of Internal Revenue held that these dividends were
taxable for the year 1913, against the parent company. The plaintiff paid the taxes under protest and brought this suit to recover the
amount so paid, claiming that the income represented by dividends,
• Supra, note 3.
•• 2137, T. D. 2090.
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had not accrued to it subsequent to March l, 1913. The trial court
sustained the contention of the plaintiff, relying on the case of
Bailey v. Railroad Company, szipra.10
The ourt after quoting at length from the Bailey Case proceeds
as follows :-(p. 716). '"The foregoing seems to be a direct authority in support of the contention of the plaintiff in the present case,
for the language of the act of 1913 is no clearer in showing an intent
of the lawmakers to tax earnings accrued prior to the time they were
subjected to the operation of the act than was the language of the
act of 1864. 'l'he argument that there should be a different construction of the act of 1913 from that given to the act of 1864 is
weakened by the fact that, at the time the earnings in the present
case accrued, the authority given to Congress by the Sixteenth
Amendment was wanting. (Italics oitrs). It seems to be perfectly
clear that the advances in the value of property during a series of
years can in no proper sense be considered gains, profits, or income
of any one particular year of the series, although the entire amount
of the advance may be at one time turned into money by the sale of
the property".
The Court then proceeds to discuss the cases of Lynch v. Turrish
and Dy11ch v. Hornby, supra, and to subscribe to the doctrine therein
laid down. The Court then continues, p. 716:-"The specific facts
in each of those cases, (Lynch v. Tttrrish and Lynch v. Hornby)
are not specially material. The complaints of the plaintiffs therein
were generally the same as the complaint of the plaintiff in the present case. Each had been assessed and compelled to pay a tax levied
upon a distribution of assets, because of the mistaken view of the
collector of internal revenue that such distribution of assets was
'income, gains, or profits within the meaning of the Income Tax
Law'".
And again p. 716 :-"It is perhaps worthy of observation that
Congress, being without authority to levy an income tax until
February 25, 1913, when the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted,
provided in Act 1913, par. G. (c) that the tax for that year should
be upon the entire net income accrued within that portion of said
year from March 1st, to December 31st, both dates inclusive, to be
ascertained by taking five-sixths of the entire net income for said
calendar year".11
1'

Supra, note 4.
Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides "Representatives and direct taxes shall
Le apportioned among the se·1eral states which may be included within this Union ac·
cording to their respective numbers". Art 1, Sec. 8, "The Congress shall have power
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises " " ,. " but all duties, imposts and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States". Art. 1, Sec. g, "No capitation
r,r other direct ta.x shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein
11
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The Court summarizes its conclusion as follows :-"The dividends
in question in this suit were not subject to the tax imposed, because
they were a distribution of surplus earnings arising through a period
of years, and which had accrued to, and the equitable ownership
thereof was vested in, the plaintiff prior to January I, I9I3, and
such earnings were not intended by Congress to be subject to taxation."
DECISIONS CoN'tRA.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals reverses the District
Court in the case last above discussed, holding that such dividends
were taxable.12 In doing so the court followed the late case of
.Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe.13 To the same effect is the
case of Towne v. Eisner. We believe that the three last named cases
are incorrectly decided. 14 We shall consider them in the order in
which they were decided.
In the Lowe Case the facts were that the plaintiff a holding company owned all of the stock of certain subsidiary companies except
directors' qualifying shares. The subsidiary companies in I9I4 de-dared certain dividends out of earnings, all of which accrued prior
to July Ist, I909· The Collector of Internal Revenue assessed the
Southern Pacific Company on these dividends for the first six
months of the year I9I4. The taxes were paid under protest and
this suit was then brought to recover the same. The Court, in holding that the dividends were taxable, attempts to draw certain distinctions which would serve to differentiate the case before it from
};~fore directed to be taken".
An income Tax Law was passed by Congress in 1861 to
rrovide additional revenue during the Civil War period, Chap. 45, Secs. 49, 51; i.:z Stat.
!.. 309. This Act as. amentled by various Acts continued in force until 1871, when it
~:i..pired and was not re-enacted. The courts in passing on the constitutionality of the
Act of 1861 and its amendments, held that nn income tax is not a direct tax, and that,
"therefore, the Acts were not unconstitutional. Springer v. U. S.. 102 U. S. 586; Clark
v. Sickel, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2862, 14 Int. Rev. Rec. 6; Smedberg v. Bentley, .:z.:z Fed. Cas.
No. 12964, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 38. However, that part of the Wilson Tariff Act of 189+
which undertook to impose ar. Income Tax, as stated in the text, was held unconstitu·
tional by the Supreme Court of the United States, as being a direct ta.r in the case oi
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (Rehearing 158 U. S. 601).
In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan on the rehearing (p. 638) in the Pollock
cise, it is pointed out that a tax upon income derived from business operations er from
the practice of a trade or profession, was not a direct tax, and that no apportionment
among the states would be necessary in so far as a tax upon income is laid t•pon those
subjects alone. However, all nice distinctions of this nature were wiped out and made
ol no further importance by the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment which provides as
follows :-"The Congress shall have -;iower to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived without apportionment among the several states, and without
-regard to any census or emuneration,,.
12 Lewellyn, Collector, v. Gulf Oil Corporation.
Supra, note i .
12 Supra, note .:z.
•• Snpra, note .:z.
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.earlier cases such as Gray v. Darlington and Lynch v. Turrish. The
Court at p. 849 says :-"But how this surplus is made up, whether
from earnings of the company or increase in value of land does not
appear" and again, at p. 85 l :-"But nowhere does the testimony or
statements warrant a finding that this surplus is an increase to capital by a year to year enhancement of the value of the capital of the
railway company, and is not from any enhancement of the value of
land or property of the corporation."
_
The distinction is clearly not a valid one, the doctrine of Gray v.
Darlington and of similar cases being broad enough to cover all
forms of profits or increase in valuation accruing prior to the incidence of the tax. The Court, however, to bolster up its decision
advances the argument that (p. 850) :-"The government cannot
tax undistributed surplus as income to the stockholders because they
were (it was) income to the stockholder when paid and not before.
While it may be that the plaintiff owning all of the capital stock of
the Central Pacific Company could have begun some action to have
disbursed the surplus, still it did not do so. The accumulation of
surplus of itself does not entitle stockholders to dividends. * * *"
"A stockholder has no interest in the profit of a corporation until
a dividend has been declared."
The answer to this contention is twofold.
First-The statement that "the government cannot tax undistributed surplus as income to the stockholders" is incorrect in view of
the language of the Act of October 3, 1913, which expressly authorizes the levying of the additional tax upon the interest which the
individual shareholder would have in undistributed profits, if distributed,15 and
Secondly-The equitable beneficial interest in such undistributed
profits is at all times vested in the individual stockholder who is
entitled ultimately to receive them.16 The earnings of a corporation,
the moment they are earned, enhance the value of the stock owned
by its stockholders and accrue to the benefit of the stockholders even
though not distributed until years later.
Again the court relies on the case of Edwards v. Keith.11 But
this case is clearly distinguishable since in the Edwards Case the
contention was that insurance premiums paid over a period of
years under a contract by which the agent was to receive a portion
of such anni.ial premiums on all policies written by him, accrued
during the year the policies were written and were therefore, not
taxable in the year received. The court in the Edwards Case, howSubdivision 2 of Sec. 2, Act of October 3rd, 1913.
Collector v. Hubbard (1870), 79 U. S. I, 18; Gulf Oil Corporatio11. v. Lewellyn,
-Collector, Supra, note 3.
1T Edwards v. Keith (1916), 231 Fed. no.
11

10
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ever, overruled this contention and in doing so pointed out that the
yearly premiums did not accrue when the policies were written and
in fact might never have accrued since there was no assurance that
the insured would pay these annual premiums. Plaintiff's commission on such premiums could, therefore, not be said to be vested, in
the year the policies were taken out, in any sense of the word. In
the Lowe Case, however, the situation is different. The dividends
which were paid in 1914, were actually earned prior to July l, 1909,
and the beneficial title thereto thereupon vested in the plaintiff. In
other words the dividends accrued prior to July l, 1909. It may be
true as the Court said (p. 852) that "financial reverses or some other
calamity might have destroyed the surplus" before it was actually
paid out as dividends, but this does not change the fact that such
dividend funds were earned and had accrued prior to the incidence
of the Income Tax Law of 1913.
Towne v. Eisner: In this case the directors and stockholders of
the Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, in December, 1913,
voted a stock dividend in payment of a dividend out of earnings, all
of which were earned prior to January lst, 1913. The share of the
plaintiff Towne in such dividend ·was taxed under the Act of October 3, 1913. Following the usual procedure, the tax was paid
under protest and this suit was brought to recover the same. The
court held that the stock dividend was taxable.18
In arriving at this conclusion the court relied on the case of
Edwards v. Keith, s1tpra, which has already been distinguished and
also the case of Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe which we have
criticised, supra.
The court further relies on the cases of Brushaber v. Union
Pacific R.R. Co. and Van Dyke v. City of Milwaukee.1 ~ Neither
of these cases supports the position of the court. It is true that the
Briishhaber Case in passing on the constitutionality of the Act of
October 3, 1913, held that that Act was constitutional even though
it was retroactive to the extent of taxing incomes accruing at any
time subsequent t6 March l, 1913, but the court had no occasion to .
and did not pass upon the question of the right of the government
to levy a tax retroactive in its operation to a point prior to the effective date of the Sixteenth Amendment. Indeed while the point
now under c6nsideration was not involved in the Brushaber case,
the language of the court in that case directly supports our contention. The Court at p. 20 speaking by Mr. Chief Justice \VH1T:r:
says :-"But the date of the retroactivity did not extend beyond the
11 Supra, note 2.
11 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. (1916). 240 U. S. 1; Van Dyke v. City of
Milwaukee (1915), 159 Wlis. 460.
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time wh~n the Amendment was operative, and there can be no dispute that there was power by virtue of the Amendment during that
period to levy the tax, without apportionment, * '~ *"
The Van Dyke Case is not in point since it arose under the state
Income Tax Law of Wisconsin and it has never been doubted that
a state can, if it sees fit, pass an income tax law, retroactive in its
effect, the several states not being restricted in the passage of income tax laws as was the Federal Government prior to the passage
of the Sixteenth Amendment. The Eisner Case is to ·be reviewed
by the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of error.19 "
Coming now to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Gulf Oil Case the court in reversing the trial court attempts to
distinguish the cases of Lynch v. Tiirrish and Lynch v. Hornby,
supra, but with no better success than attended the efforts of the
court in the Loew Case. The Court of Appeals ignores the reasoning of the trial court and the constitutional aspect of the case.
In all three of the cases last discussed, the Lowe, Eisner and Gulf
Oil Cases, the court rings the changes on the distinction between
"income" and "capital assets" and attempts to distinguish Lynch v.
Turrish, supra, and similar cases on that ground. While the distinction is often an important one it is not the controlling factor in
these cases. The question is not as to the nature of the fund sought
to be taxed whether income or capital but whether or not an income
tax can be imposed on earnings accruing prior to the incidence of
the tax. If the earnings accrued prior to the incidence of such tax,
then they are not taxable, irrespective of whether the fund retains
its status as income or has been merged into capital.
To summarize the argument supporting the doctrine of Gray .v.
Darlington and the cases which have followed it and rejecting the
principles laid down in the Gulf Oil and similar cases : The Act of
1913 provides for a levy of income tax only "upon the entire net
income arising or accruing in the preceding calendar year".2 D However, it may be conceded as suggested in the Bailey Case, supra, that
it would be competent for Congress to pass an income tax law taxing
a fund which had accrued during a preceding year, and Congress has
in fact done so in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917, but this
1"• After the above article was written but before going to press, the Supreme Court
of the United States (January 7th, 1918) handed down its decision in the case of Towne
v. Eisner, supra, reversing the trial court. The Supreme Court, however, bases its ciecision upon tbe sole ground that stock dividends arc not proper subjects of income
taxation, the theory being that "'A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property
of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interest of the shareholders. Its property is
not diminished and their interests are not increased'."
The Court quotes the above language from the case of Gibbons v. Mahon, 136
1.'. s. 549.
'"Sec. :: A., Subdivision I, Act of October 3rd, 1913.
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retroactivity cannot extend to a date prior to the effective date of the
Sixteenth Amendment. That Congress by the Act of 1913 did not
intend and did not attempt to do this, is apparent from the language
last above quoted from the Act and it is also apparent from the further fact that a special provision is contained in that Act limiting the
taxable income for that year to that which accrued subsequent to
March 1, 1913, the date when the Act became operative.21 But in
any event Congress could not, in z9z3, have legally passed an income
tax law affecting income accruing in an earlier year. In other
words, if prior to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress did not have authority to lay a tax on income then it cannot,
subsequent to the date of the Amendment, pass a law retroactive to
a poi.llt prior thereto.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

In 1894, Congress in enacting the Wilson Tariff Act undertook to
lay a tax on incomes.22 The following year the Supreme Court of
the United States in the leading case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Company held the Act unconstitutional in so far as it applied
to incomes derived from the renting of real property or from the
investment of personal property.23 This decision resulted in the
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Just as the decision in the Pollock Case, which was
undoubtedly correct, created the necessity for the passage of the
Sixteenth i\mendment as a condition precedent to the enactment of
any valid income tax legislation, so the erroneous rulings of the
Treasury Department, made it incumbent upon Congress to define
specifically, "gains" and "dividends", with reference to the time of
their accrual, so as to secure uniformity in the administration of the
law. In doing so Congress no doubt took cognizance of the fact that
February 25th, 1913, the effective date of the Sixteenth Amendment
was the earliest date upon which the incidence of the ta~ could be
fixed-that "gains, profits and income", accruing prior to that date
could not be reached for purposes of income taxation. In view of
the pressing needs of the Government for additional revenue, however, Congress no doubt desired to make the scope of the law as
wide as possible and accordingly fixed on March lst, 1913, a few
days after the taking effect of the Amendment, as the date of
incidence.
21 Par. G. (c), Act of October 3rd, 1913.
"'Act of Congress, August 27th, 1894, 28 Stat. 509, e 349.
.. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company (1895), 157 U. S. 429, on rehearing
158 u. s. 601.
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Pursuant to this design we find in the Act of September 8th, 1916,
the following definition of "gain";"For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sak
or other disposition of property, real, personal or mixed, acquired
before March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, the fair market
price or value of such property as of March first, nineteen hundred
and thirteen, shall be the basis for determining the amount of such
gain derived". 2"'
This provision is not amended by the Act of October 3rd, 1917.
As the law now is, therefore, the gain derived from the sale or other
disposition of property acquired by a corporation prior to March
1st, 1913, and sold subsequent thereto shall be determined by deducting from the selling price, the "fair market price or value" as of
March 1st, 1913, even though the original purchase price was much
less or much greater than the market price as of that date. 25
As to property acquired subsequent to March 1st, 1913, there can
also be no difficulty. Here the rule is that the gain from the sale of
property acquired subsequent to March 1st, 1913, for the purpose of
the Act shall be the difference between the selling price and the
actual price paid for it together with the expense incident to the
procurement of the property in the first instance, and its sale thereafter, plus the cost of improvement or development, if any. In determining the cost of property for the purpose of arriving at the profit
realized upon the sale it will be permissible for the corporation to add
to the initial cost, such carrying charges as interest, taxes, insurance,
.etc., provided such carrying charges have not been deducted from
the net income returned for years subsequent to the incidence of the
tax and prior to the date of the sale. 26
The entire "gain" as thus defined, is taxable in the year in which
the property is sold or disposed of, and is not pro-rated even though
the increase in value is a gradual accretion extending over a period
of years. This is merely a way of saying that the law takes no
cognizance of increase in valuations evidenced merely by book entries. It only concerns itself with a completed, a closed transaction.27
The term "dividends" is defined in the Act of September 8th, 1916,
as follows: "Provided, that the term dividends as used in this title
shall be held to mean any distribution made or ordered to be made
by a corporation, joint-stock company, association- or insurance com"Sec. 2 (c), Act of September 8th, 1916.
*'T. D. 2090.
•T. D. 2137.
'Z1 Baldwin Locomotive Works v. :McCoach (1915), 221 Fed. 59; United States v.
-Guggenheim Exploration Co. (1917), 238 Fed. 231; T. D. 2185.
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pany out of its earnings or profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and payable to its shareholders, whether
in cash or in stock of the corporation, joint-stock company, association or insurance company, which stock-dividend shall be considered
income to the amount of its cash value." 28
This proviso or definition does not appear in the 1913 Act and
like the definition of "gain" supra, was no doubt inserted in the 1916
Act as a guide to and indeed a check against erroneous rulings in
the future by the Treasury Department, and by the Courts such as
those already referred to. But it should be noted that neither of the
~wo provisions of the Act of 1916, last above referred to restricted
the range of the tax. On the contrary they greatly enlarged it since
under the Act of October 3rd, 1913, only "gains, profits or income"
accruing diering the taxable year were properly taxable, whereas
under the Act of September 8th, 1916, as it originally was, and also
as amended, the taxable field is extended so as to embrace all "gains,
profits or income" accruing subsequent to March 1st, 1913, and
received in the taxable year.
This conclusion is irresistible when we consider the above provisions taken in conjunction with the radical difference in the opening words of the 1913 Act and those of the Act of 1916, as amended.
The earlier Act provides that, "There shall be levied, assessed and
paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accrning from
all sources ditring the preceding calendar year, to every corporation,
etc." The language of the instant Act on the other hand is that
"There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually upon
the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from all
sources by every corporation."
The case of Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe, supra, furnishes
a remarkable instance of judicial oversight which strengthens the argument that that case is incorrectly decided. The Court in summing
up its conclusion in that case uses the following language: "Since
these dividenqs were received within the six months and 'were paid
as part of the gross income to the plaintiff as a stockholder of the
railroad company and were received ·within the year 'from all sources,' (Italics ours) I am of the opinion that the collector was right
in levying this assessment and collecting this tax; and accordingly,
there must be judgment directed for the defendant * * *''25 The
words "were received within the year froni aU sources" do not appear at all in the Act of October 3rd, 1913, but are substituted in the
.. Sec. :z (a), Act of September 8th, 1916.
21 • Supra, note :z at p. 853.
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Act of September 8th, 1916, for the words "arising or accruing from
all sottrces during the preceding calendar year'' which is the langauge
of the Act of October 3rd, 1913. The change in the law is a vital
one as will be readily seen by a simple illustration. The X Trust
Company performed services for a client during the years 191 l and
1912, for which it rendered a bill of $s,ooo.oo on January 1st, 1913,
and received payment June 1st, 1913. No services are rendered in
the year 1913 or after the incidence of the tax. No part of the
$s,ooo.oo is taxable as income. The same services are rendered during the years 1915 and 1916 and payment is received in 1916. The
entire $s,ooo.oo is taxable as income in 1916, the year in which it is
received.
The Act of October 3rd, 1917, materially amended the Act of
September 8th, 1916, in regard to dividends. Subdivision (b) of
sub-section 31, is new and works a radical change in the law. 29
Prior to the passage of the amendment it was held by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that a corporation might declare dividends subsequent to March 1st, 1913, out of earnings earned prior
to that date without having first distributed as dividends, "the most
recently accumulated undivided profits or surplus" provided that the
corporation should "specifically inform the stoc~holders that the
dividends were declared and paid", out of surplus and profits accrued prior to March 1st, 1913, and should make proper entries on
the books of the corporation showing that fact. In this connection
it was said by the Commissioner, that "it is immaterial to this office
whether dividends are paid out of current earnings or surplus acquired prior to March 1st, 1913."30
All this has been changed by the amendment which specifically
provides that any distribution to stockholders "shall be deemed to
.. Subsec. 31 (b) of Sec. 1211, Act of September 8th, 1916, as amended by Act of
October 3rd, 1917, on account of its importance is here set out in full and is as follows:
"(b). Any distribution made to the shareholders or members of a corporation,
joint·stock company, or association, or insurance company, in the year nineteen hundred
and seventeen, or subsequent tax years, shall be deemed to have been made from the
most recently accumulated undivided profits or surplus, and shall constitute a part of the
annual income of the distributee for the year in which received, and shall he taxed to
the distributee at the rates prescribed by law for the years in which such profits or sur·
plus were accumulated by the corporation, joint·stock company, association, or insurance
company, but nothing herein shall be construed as taxing any earnings or profits accrued
prior to March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, but such earnings or profits may be
distributed in stock dividends or otherwise, exempt :from the t;llt, after the distribution
of earnings and profits accrued since March first. nineteen hundred and thirteen, has
been made. This subdivision shall not apply to any distribution made prior to August
sixth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, out of earnings or profits accrued prior to
March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen."
:ao Letter to Corporation Trust Company signed by Acting Commissioner David A.
Gates, dated January 23rd, 1917.
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have been made from the most recently accumulated undivided profits or surplus and shall constitute a part of the annual income of
the distributee for the year in which received and shall be taxed to
the distributee at the rate prescribed by law for the years in which
such profits or siirplits were acrnmulated by the corporation but
nothing herein shall be construed as taxing any earnings or profits
accrued prior to March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, but such
earnings or profits may be distributed in stock dividends or otherwise exempt from the tax after the distribution of earnings and
profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen has
been made".81
It follows, therefore, that all earnings or profits earned and accumulated subsequent to March 1st, 1913, must now first be distributed by a corporation, subject to be taxed in the hands of the
stockholders. After this has been done then "gains, profits and income" accruing prior to :March 1st, 1913, may be distributed to the
stockholders as dividends and will be tax free. 82
From what has already been said it is apparent that there is an
important distinction between the method in which dividends ac~ing over a period of years and gains, profits and income of a corporation, not distributed as dividends, accruing over a like period,
are now taxed." In the case of dividends, while the .entire amount
of the dividend is taxable in the year received, (subject to the limitation that "gains, profits and income" accruing prior to March I, 1913,
are not taxable at all) it may represent items earned over a series of
years. in which event the several rates in force in the years in which
such items were earned will apply.32 • On the other hand gains or
profits other than dividends, as for example, increases in value of
land during a series of years or compensation for services extending
over several years would be taxed in their entirety, in the year the
gain or profit was received, at the rate of taxation in force that year.
11 Supra, note 29 •
.. Supra, note 29.
ua The point is further illustrated by a late ruling of the Treasury Department:"Where a Non-resident Alien (Corporation) received a dividend in 1916 from a Domestic
Corporation which was earned by the corporation partly in 1915 and partly in 1916, the
tax to be withheld is :z per cent of the entire dividend," T. D. 2584. (Released for
publication November 24th, 1917.) This ruling is correct under the Act of September
8th, 1916, because the dividend was "received" in 1916 and the 1916 rate of :z per cent
is applicable. The ruling would be incorrect as applied to a similar case arising under
the Act of October 3rd, 1913, for the reason that only that part of the dividend "accruing''
during the taxable year would be taxable. But it should be noted further that the ruling
would also be incorrect as to dividends paid in 1917, since under the Act of September
8th, 1916, as amended by the Act of October 3rd, 1917, the dividend would be apportioned, the part "accruing'' in 1915 being taxable at the rate for that year (1 per
cent) and the part accruing in 1916 would be taxable at the :z per cent rate.
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In the practical administration of the law, cases will no doubt arise
in which it will be difficult to determine what is the "most recently
accumulated undivided profits or surplus". The law specifically
requires the paying corporation to give "information at the source"
including the names and addresses of stockholders, and the number
of shares owned by each, and the tax years and applicable amounts
in which such dividends were earned in such form and manner as
may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury."33 While not in terms
required by the Act it would seem also to be the duty of the corporation or individual receiving the dividend to ascertain this information
from the paying corporation and to make their returns accordingly.
However, these are mere matters of detail. The important point is
that Congress has definitely withdrawn from the field of income
taxation, "gains, profits and income" accruing prior to March 1st,
1913, and has also established a workable, and as we believe, equitable means of taxing corporate earnings accumulated subsequent
to March 1st, 1913.

Tm:

RULE IN PARI MATE:RIA.

The argument in support of our contention that the decisions
reached in the Lowe, Gulf Oil and Eisner Cases are incorrect, is
strengthened in view of the well established principle that acts in
pari materia, that is, acts relating to the same general subject matter
are to be construed together. "All the enactments of the same legislature on the same general subject-matter are to be regarded as parts
of one uniform system. Later statutes are considered as supplementary or complementary to the earlier enactment. In the course
of the entire legislative dealings with the subject we are to discover
the progressive development of a uniform and consistent design or
else the continued modification and adaptation of the original design
to apply to changing conditions or circumstances. In the passage of
each Act the legislative body must be supposed to have had in mind
and in contemplation the existing legislation on the ·same subject
and to have shaped its new enactment with reference thereto." 34
When we come to consider therefore the language of the Act of
October 3, 1913, itself, and particularly that provision which limits
for the year 1913 the taxable income to that income "accruing'' sub• Subscc. :z6 of Sec. 1210, Act of September 8th, 1916, as amended by Act of
October 3rd, 1917.
H Black, Interpretation of Laws, (:znd, ed.) pp. 332-334.
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sequent to March I, 1913, and when we read these provisions in conjunction with the language of the original Act of 1916, as
amended by the Act of October 3, 1917, limiting taxable profits on
sales of property and taxable dividends to those. accruing after
March I, 1913, and permitting the distribution of earnings accrued
prior to March Ist, 1913, as tax free dividends, the consistent design of Congress at all times to tax only those profits or dividends
which accrue after the incidence of the tax to be levied is apparent:
The d.ecisions in the Lowe, Eisner and Gulf Oil Cases are the
more inexplicable, in that they were all handed down subsequent to
September 8th, 1916, and while not arising under the Act of that
date ~he definition of "dividends" therein contained limiting dividends taxable as income to those accruing subsequent to March 1st,
1913, should have had a great, if not controlling influence on the
courts in construing the terms, "gains, profits and income" as used
in the earlier Act.
While disclaiming all desire or intention to be unduly critical, we
believe the facts warrant the statement that the Treasury Department quite consistently--or inconsistently-and the Federal Courts
at times-notably in the Gulf Oil,· Eisner and Lowe Cases-in the
administration of the income tax laws, have been disposed to _reverse
the usual rule applicable to the construction of internal revenue laws
in general, and specifically income tax laws, and to resolve all doubts
against the taxpayer, and in favor of the Government. In this connection the late case of Gould v. Gould is most pertinent. In that
case the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking by Mr. Justice McREYNOI.DS said :-"In the futerpretation of statutes levying
taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed
out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the
government and in favor of the citizen."35
It i~ perhaps pertinent to note that while income taxation has for
many years in England and other countries been a constant and substantial source of revenue, until a comparatively recent time there
has been a marked aversion by the American people to any form of
income tax. That a present necessity for income taxation in this
country exists and that such necessity will be a continuing one,
seems certain. It would, therefore, be most inadvisable and impolitic for the Treasury Department and the courts to insist on a
""Gould v. Gould (1917, 38 Sup. Ct. 53.
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theory of administration of our income tax system which would
exact the last pound of flesh from the already over burdened taxpayer.35
RoBitRT M. DRYSDALE,
MAURICE C. McG1FF1N,
Detroit, Michigan.
•While the decisions of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals are ordinarily
final ;n income tax casP.s (Sec. 128. Judicial Code. 36 Stat. at L. 1133. Comp. St. 19n,
p. 193), if the views above expressed are correct then it would seen to follow that there
is a constitutional question involved in the case of Lewellyn, Collector v. Gulf Oil Corporation and similar cases entitling the tax payers to have the cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The writer has been advised unoflicially by the Clerk of the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third District that an application for a writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court has been or is to be made in the case of Lewellyn v. Gulf Oil Corporation, supra.

